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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement Of The Problem 
Three hundred thousand people are admitted to mental hospitals in 
the United States annually. Of these, eighty to ninety pe~cent are 
involuntarily committed. 1 The Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution 
guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty by any state 
without due process of law. When a state forces a person to enter 
and remain in a mental hospital, the patient loses his personal 
liberty. This deprivation is particularly severe in the case of the 
mentally ill, since the patients are normally committed for an 
indeterminate stay in a mental hospital. 
Medically the indeterminate stay is desirable since the patient 
needs to remain in the hospital until his problem is solved, and no 
court or doctor can decide how long the cure will require prior to 
commitment. In practice this can mean years of life without liberty 
for the mental patient. 
This point is well illustrated by a recently reported case. 2 If 
a visitor to the Greenlee County, Arizona courthouse examined old 
1R. Postel, "Civil Commitment: A Functional Analysis," 38 
Brooklyn Law Review 3,4 (1971). 
2n. Wexler, s. Scoville et al., nSpecial Project: The Administra-
tion of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona," 13 
Arizona Law Review 1, 2 (1971). 
1 
files he might discover that a nineteen year old Mexican-American 
woman was committed in 1912. It was reported to the local sheriff 
2 
that the girl was acting irrationally. Upon investigation the girl was 
taken into custody by the sheriff, and commitment proceedings were 
begun. Two doctors who examined the girl reported that she had not 
made any threats to commit suicide or murder. They described her as 
happy, having a tendency to laugh and sing. She also wanted to d9.nce. 
Reportedly she could not sit still. The doctors were concerned since 
the patient had been known in the past as a quiet person. 3 
The doctors concluded that the young woman was insane, but they 
felt her condition was temporary and she would recover. The cause of 
the illness was reported as "bathing in cold w::iter at menstrual 
period." On this basis the local probate judge signed a commitment 
order, and she was sent to the territorial asylum in Phoenix, Arizona 
on January 23, 1912. She was to remain there until she recovered 
from this temporary illness. The next order in the patientis file 
was a request by the Phoenix hospital asking that the patient ls 
funds be used to help pay her expenses during her involuntary commit-
ment. This order was dated May 26, 1969, and when the Arizona Law 
Review article telling about the case was written in 1971, the patient 
was seventy-eight years old. 4 
There was no evidence to indicate that the young lady committed 
in 1912 was a threat to anyone. She was apparently committed for her 
own good. This seems hard to justify if medical knowledge was not 
3Ibid. 
4rbid. 
available to help her. On the other hand, if the medical knowledge 
was available, a great injustice was done if she was forced to enter 
the hospital and the treatment was not applied. In the case Wyatt v. 
Stickney a United States District Court opinion pro~ides a good 
explanation of the unfairness of prolonged commitment without treat-
ment. 
When patients are ••• committed for treatment purposes they 
unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such 
individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic 
opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental 
condition. Adequate and effective treatment is constitu-
tionally required because, absent treatment, t~e hospital 
is transformed "into a penitentiary whe5e one G:ould be held 
indefinitely for no convicted offence." . 
Admittedly, this case shows an extreme possibility. Oth~r less 
dramatic cases can be developed to show the abusive nature of 
commitment proceedings that often take place with little concern for 
due process. As we review some examples, it should be remembered 
that these people might have been saved days, months or even years 
of improper confinement if they had enjoyed the same rights we grant 
persons in criminal proceedings. 
3 
One major problem is that concepts such as mental illness are 
extremely vague and are hard to apply under our legal system. 6 Legis-
lators cannot define a precise set of facts that constitute mental 
illness and have allowed medical experts to define mental illness on 
a case by case basis. For example a mentally ill person is defined in 
Oklahoma as a person ttafflicted with a mental illness to such an 
5 Wyatt~· Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
6supra. note 1 at 14. 
4 
extent that he is incapable of managing himself and his affairs .117 
No separate definition is given as to what constitutes mental illness. 
Thus, mental illness is whatever the doctors say it is. This 
situation has led David B. Wexler to argue that psychiatrists can 
place almost anyone in the mentally ill category for any reason he 
8 
wants. Our legal system has not provided protection against 
possible abuse by psychiatrists. This, of course, makes most of us 
subject to involuntary commitment since we may not be given a chance 
to establish our sanity during the commitment proceeding. Thus, 
without procedural safeguards, the potential for injustice is great. 
This is illustrated by the fact that problems in marriages may 
lead to questionable involuntary commitment. In one case a wife 
filed an application for divorce and an affidavit for the commitment 
of her husband on the same day without telling him. He was picked up 
by two policemen at his home. They came with their lights flashing 
and told him that he needed to come to the station to settle something 
involving an old accident. He was taken to a mental hospital. The 
resident on duty told him he could make one phone call. He called 
his wife since he did not realize she had arranged fior his commitment. 
She responded, noh, that is terrible that you have been picked up. I 
shall take care of everything." She did not do anything to help him 
and the hospital held him for two weeks before realizing nothing was 
wrong with him. 9 Under a system that provided adequate protection 
743A Okla. Stat. sect. 3 (Supp. 1970). 
8 D. Wexler, nThe Therapeutic Justice," 57 Minnesota Law Review 
293, 294 (1972). 
9 T. Szasz, Law, Liberty and Psychiatry 62, 63 (1963). 
5 
for the patientis rights this would have been discovered much sooner. 
One New Jersey woman was held for three years in a state mental 
institution, against her will, after the hospitalts staff had judged 
her sane? Even though they felt she was sane, she was forced to stay 
in the hospital because she did not have any family, and they feared 
that she might have to go on welfare. 10 This reasoning seems absurd 
for two reasons. First, she was already on welfare in the sense 
that the state was supporting her in the mental hospital. Second, she 
was a registered nurse and had been working as such in the hospital. 
She probably could have found related work after discharge from the 
hospital. Since the legal reason for her commitme)t no longer existed, 
she should have been released. It has been suggested that she was 
not released because her work as a nurse was valuable to the hospital. 11 
The injustice in the situation is obvious. 
Another remarkable example of unjustifiable involuntary commitment 
is provided by Thomas Szasz. 
Only recently ••• a 34-year old Falls Church, Virginia, trash 
collector was held in the Southwestern State Hospital for the 
Criminally Insane in Marion, Virginia. He had previously been 
taken into custody upon suspicion of murdering the Carrol 
Jackson family when Peter Herkos, an alleged "mind reader" with 
"clairvoyant" power, pointed to him as a suspect. Mr. Herkos 
was invited to this area and had his expenses paid by a 
psychiatrist on the staff of St. Elizabethts Hospital, Dr. Regis 
Riesenman. Without any evidence to make a forma 1 charge, the 
police, acting upon the recommendation of Dr. Riesenman, who 
in turn relied upon the recommendation of the "mind reader" 
for his evaluation of the case, picked up the unfortunate 
trash collector for questioning. After it was determined 
he was not the murderer he was not released, but instead, 
was subjected to civil commitment proceedings. Again Dr. 
Riesenman entered the case. He even sat as sole psychiatrist 
of the three-member hastily convened board which adjudged 
that the man be committed to a mental hospital for the 
criminally insane ••• Parenthetically, a man named Melvin Rees 
has since been convicted in Virginia for murdering two other 
members of the family ••• The fact remains, however, that the 
commonwealth of Virginia succeeded in depriving a citizen of 
6 
his liberty under mental health auspices for no reason which 
could stand the scrutiny of impartial and rational investigation, 
and in a manner which did violence to every factor considered 
essential to due process of law.12 
This passage again makes our point clearly. Improper commitment can 
occur and has occurred when we do not allow those accused of being 
mentally ill the rights associated with due process. 
Injustice has also occurred when others, such as rrhippies,rr 
have been declared mentally ill and committed because they have 
13 
unusual life styles. Some psychiatrists consider members of the 
John Birch Society to be paranoid to the point of mental illness. 14 
The investigation of Major General Edwin Walker•s mental health in 
1962 was a widely publicized example ot using mental health laws 
15 
against political extremists. General Walker had the resources to 
fight back and win. Unfortunately, many of us would not have those 
resources under the same circumstances. 
Commitment based on political belief or life style alone is 
very dangerous. Certainly, under our Constitution we cannot support 
commitment based on such broad definitions of insanity. Procedural 
safeguards are needed to protect those citizens whom a psychiatrist 
might call insane using such a broad definition. 
12 
Id. at pages 64, 65. 
13 
Supra. note 8 at 295. 
14 
Ibid. 
15 T. Szasz, Psychiatric Justice 178 (1965). 
7 
Our society allows the murderer and rapist certain rights to 
insure that only the guilty are convicted. We even allow the petty 
criminal who faces a short jail term certain basic procedural safe-
guards. Does it not seem reasonable to allow those accused of being 
mentally ill procedural safeguards to help prevent the sane from being 
subjected to an indeterminate sentence in a state mental hospital? 
Many psychiatrists reject this position and are in favor of 
simple commitment procedures that do not provide many due process 
rights. 16 In testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
Dr. Jack Ewalt, a representative of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, testified: 
From a medical view, the worst features of the commitment 
laws of the past ••• are requirements such as these: that 
the patient must be given "notice" that he is to be com .. 
mitted; the insistence that the patient appear personally 
in court with the consequent exposure of his problems to 
the public; the acceptance of a lay judgment as to the degree 
of illness as occurs, for example, in a jury trial ••• If 
judicial procedures must be brought into play at all, the court 
should have discretionary power to eliminate notification to 
the patient and not require the patient to be present in 
person at the hearing.17 
This view of the commitment process assumes that the doctors will 
always represent the best interest of the patient and as a result 
legal safeguards are unnecessary. 
These arguments might be acceptable if we had a much more perfect 
way of knowing, prior to hearing, that the person is, in fact, mentally 
ill and needs help. In reality we are dealing with imperfect human 
16J. Katz.=.:.~., Psychoanalysis Psychiatry and Law 468 (1967). 
171d. at pages 467, 468. 
8 
beings who are administering an under-financed system. We have seen 
cases of people being committed without a good reason for commitment. 
It is hard to justify the reasoning that due process rights should be 
ignored to provide for simpler hearings that will not upset patients. 
There seems to be an even greater danger that people will be wrong-
fully committed. 
The danger that we are attempting to illustrate, that people may 
be committed without a proper reason; brings us to our probelern. 
Generally, we are interested in whether safeguards built into 
Oklahomats commitment process are adequate to protect defendants from 
improper commitment. We will break this problem down into two 
specific questions. First, does Oklahoma law provide adequate 
statutory protection to make involuntary commitment of the sane un-
likely? Here we will examine the law to see whether it is adequate 
theoretically to assure that the rights of those accused of insanity 
are protected. 
Our examination of the law will indicate what rights the legis-
lature felt should be protected at involuntary civil commitment 
proceedings in Oklahoma, but it is important that we go beyond this 
to determine how the law is actually used. Thus our second question 
moves us from a theoretical discussion to an empirical investigation 
of whether commitment proceedings in Tulsa and Payne Counties apply 
state law in a way that makes the commitment of the sane improbable. 
To find the answers to our problems we will deal with three more 
specific problems on both the theoretical and practicable levels. 
First, does the defendant have the right to be represented by counsel 
at his commitment hearing? Second, was the defendant given the 
9 
opportunity to be present at his commitment hearing? Third, was the 
defendant afforded the right to have his sanity determined by a jury? 
These questions provide the focus of our emphasis as we try to deter-
mine whether adequate protection is provided for those accused of 
insanity under Oklahoma law both in theory and practice. Chapter two 
will provide a more detailed analysis of the importance of these 
three rights. 
Hypothesis 
In our examination of Oklahoma's involuntary commitment statutes 
and their application we expect to find a general lack of protection of 
the rights of those accused of insanity. This means that ~e expect to 
find a lack of protection in one or more of the areas mentioned above 
since we are arguing that exclusion from the hearing, lack of counsel 
or denial of a jury trial increases the probability of improper 
commitment. These expected results suggest answers to the two main 
questions developed from our problem. 
The first question was, "Does Oklahoma law provide adequate sta-
tutory protection to make involuntary commitment of the sane unlikely?" 
In response to this question we expect to find that adequate protection 
is not provided under Oklahoma law to make improper commitment un-
likely. Thus on the theoretical level we expect to find that Oklahoma 
law is not written in a way that guarantees the protection of the three 
basic civil rights that we mentioned earlier. "Do involuntary 
commitment proceedings in Tulsa and Payne Counties apply state law in 
a way that makes the commitment of the sane improbable?" We answer 
this problem with the hypothesis that involuntary commitment proceed-
ings in Tulsa and Payne Counties do not apply Oklahoma law in a way 
that adequately protects the rights of those accused of insanity. 
Methodology 
10 
Our first problem will be to determine whether Oklahoma law pro-
vides adequate statutory protection against improper commitment. 
Oklahoma law will be judged adequate if it insures that patients have 
the opportunity and aid necessary to present a legal defense against 
the charge of insanity. The problem here is not complicated since 
legal sources are available that give a complete picture of what 
Oklahoma civil commitment law is. Our data will consist of Oklahoma 
statutes and state appellate court cases interpreting those provisions. 
Analysis will consist of comparing the law as it is to what we feel 
the law should be to protect adequately the rights of those accused 
of insanity. 
The methodological problems become greater when we move to our 
second area of concern and try to discover how the law is applied. 
To find out how the law is applied we will use a combination of re-
search techniques. These will include non-participant observation 
and interviews with officials involved in the commitment process. 
Non-participant observation provides a useful method of obtaining a 
wide variety of information concerning the application of state law. 
Interviews will be used to provide supplemental information to verify 
the accuracy of observations and to obtain information when observation 
is either impossible or undesirable. 
Non-participant observation is an appropriate method for our 
purposes since it will allow the researcher to discover how the legal 
ll 
process works. Without some experience with actual commitment 
hearings it would be difficult to design an observation form that 
yielded the maximum amount of useful information on the commitment 
process. Thus, observation of actual commitment hearings will be 
essential to the early phases of research and observation form devel-
opment. If the entire project were completed without any direct 
observation of commitment hearings, important problems might be 
ignored. The point is that if we do not have a good idea how 
commitment hearings are organized and administered, we may miss entire 
areas of observation that are significant. 
Once we have decided to use an observation technique, we must 
consider when and where to use it. As our hypothesis states, we 
will consider the commitment process in Tulsa and Payne Counties. 
Payne and Tulsa Counties were selected for this study because they are 
conveniently located and it is economically feasible for the researcher 
to attend hearings in both areas. In Payne County, commitment hearings 
were observed between March 22, 1974; and May 22, 1974. Because of the 
relatively small number of commitments in Payne County, an attempt 
was made to obtain information on all hearings held during the period 
of observation. Observations took place in Tulsa County between 
August 21, 197~ and M~rch 21, 1975. Since Tulsa Cotinty normally had 
one or more commitment hearings each day while the Probate Court was 
in session, a sample of Tulsa cases was observed. Since the observer 
could only attend hearings in Tulsa on certain days, the hearings to be 
attended were selected on this basis. This procedure provided a 
reasonable basis for generalizations about the commitment process in 
the two counties during the time of study. 
12 
One problem associated with observation studie$ is that the 
presence of the observer may alter the behavior of those being 
observed. 18 It can be argued that the effect of the observer will be 
small, since people seem to get used to observers if they do not 
appear to be a threat to the group. One study found that the effect 
of the observer on small groups was reduced considerably after three 
periods of observation. 19 It is also important that the hearing 
members not know any details about what the goals of the research are. 
If specific aims are not presented, those being observed cannot know 
how to react to give the researcher a desired impression. 20 
The method used to record information gathered from observation 
is also a problem closely related to our above discussion. We must 
record observations accurately, but at the same time we must avoid 
making the recording so obvious that it constantly reminds participants 
in the hearings that they are being watched or tells them what the 
observer is looking for. One recormnended method to reduce the groupts 
feeling that it is being watched is to remember some information for 
recording immediately after leaving the group that is being observed.21 
This strategy seems particularly appropriate for our needs. To 
facilitate recording the information a form was developed to fill out 
after each commitment hearing. This form insures both that all 
18E. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in 
the Social ScienceS-51 (1968). 
19c. Selltiz et.!!..!., Research Methods in Social Relations 233, 234 
(1964). 
200. Forcese ands. Richer, Social Research Methods 146 (1973). 
21 
Ibid. 
relevant questions are considered after each hearing and that com-
parable information is generated for the study. The most important 
precaution in recording information after the hearing is making sure 
that it is recorded inunediately while the observer•s memory is as 
accurate as possible. 
13 
Discussion of the observation recording form brings us to a final 
important consideration of the observation technique. That is, what 
are we going to look for? Since we will be taking the trouble to 
attend the hearings and we can never go back to supplement incomplete 
information, it is important that as much data as possible be gathered 
from each commitment hearing. For this reason we gathered information 
that was needed to test our hypotheses and information which proved 
to be of value in explaining our results. 
To see whether adequate protection is provided against improper 
commitment at sanity hearings, the three questions that were mentioned 
earlier were examined. First, in order to determine whether defendants 
at commitment hearings have the right to counsel, we recorded whether 
they had counsel representing them and whether they were informed 
during the hearing that they had the right to counsel. In order to 
ascertain whether defendants had the right to have their aanity decided 
by a jury, we noted whether a jury was assembled to judge their sanity 
and whether the defendants were told that they had the right to have 
their sanity determined by a jury during the commitment hearing. The 
information gathered under each of these rubrics does not present any 
interpretation problems for the observer. The defendant was either at 
the hearing or he was not, and this should be clear to any observer. 
While it was easy to gather the types of information mentioned 
14 
above, we also attempted to obtain other information that required more 
interpretation. Further material was gathered to attempt to show what 
conditions make connnitment more likely. Two types df information that 
required more interpretation were the attitudes of the sanity connnis-
sion toward the defendant and the attitudes of the defendant toward 
the hearing. The interpretation problem amounted to classifying 
behavior into categories that are representative of certain types of 
behavior by connnission members or defendants. This information might 
have been useful in showing the effects of behavior on the outcome of 
connnitment hearings. A sample observation recording form appears in 
Appendix A. 
The second method that was used to gather evidence on how ade-
quately the defendants rights are protected at commitment hearings was 
interviewing persons who have attended sanity hearings. Those inter-
viewed could include judges, doctors, lawyers, or social workers who 
have attended cormnitment hearings. Focused interviews were used 
with these respondents. In the focused interview the interviewer knows 
in advance what topic and what areas of the topic he wishes to cover, 
but the specific questions and timing of questions are left up to the 
interviewer.22 This method was particularly useful in our study as a 
supplement to observed hearings. 
The advantage of the focused interview is that it allows one to 
obtain a wide variety of information. Much of this information could 
not be obtained through observation. The disadvantage of focused 
interviewing is that the answers of various respondents may not be 
22rd. at pages 263, 264. 
15 
comparable, since respondents will be asked different questions.23 
This was not a significant problem, since the primary information 
source was the. observation of actua 1 hearings, with the focused 
interviews providing a source of supplemental information. 
Review of the Literature 
The literature on the involuntary commitment process contains many 
articles that deal with the statutory provisions of various states. 
One of these studies is a 1971 American Bar Association report authored 
by Brake! and Rock. 24 This study details what statutory protections 
defendants have under state law in the fifty states. An article by 
Wexler and Scoville presents the statutory provisions under Arizona 
25 law, while a New York Law Forum article examines New Yorkts involun-
tary commitment laws.26 
The method used by these articles involves normative legal 
research. The authors· examine statutory provisions and case law that 
is relevant to involuntary commitment proceedings in the area they are 
studying. All three studies provide a thorough analysis of the law 
and argue what impact the particular legal arrangements will have on 
the rights of patients. While such studies can speculate on the 
probability of improper commitment they cannot tell how often improper 
commitment. 
24s. Brakel and R. Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1971). 
25 Supra. note 2 at 1, 2. 
26 nMenta 1 Illness and Due Process: Involuntary Commitment in New 
York," 16 New York Law Forum (1970). 
16 
A small number of studies have gone beyond the scope of most law 
review articles on the topic and have tried to desc1:ibe how the 
corranitment process works in practice. One of these studies was con-
ducted by Luis Kutner. 27 In this study Kutner found that commitment 
hearings in Chicago took from two to ten minutes. He suggested that 
this represented a real danger.since, during this short time, doctors 
had to decide whether the person was sane. In seventy-seven per cent 
of the cases the doctors found the defendant to be insane. He further 
suggested that defendants were under such heavy sedation that they 
could not defend themselves and that the patients were not w:irned that 
they had a right to counsel and to a jury trial. In fact, the study 
found that social workers who informed patients of these rights were 
punished and were informed that they would be dismissed if they 
continued to refuse to ncooperate with the doctors. 1128 
Although the conclusions reached by this study are interesting, it 
could be argued that Kutner went far beyond reasonable bounds in inter-
preting his data. The most serious problem with the study is that his 
conclusions are based on three newspaper articles, an interview with a 
judge, and an interview with a social worker. 29 Certainly the study 
points to possible problems, but it goes too far when it makes asser-
tions about the entire Cook County commitment process on the basis of 
two interviews and some newspaper articles. While the Kutner study has 
obvious methodological faults, it does raise important questions and 
27L. Kutner, rrThe Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceed-
ings," 57 Northwestern University Law Review (1962). 
28 
Id. at page 385. 
29Ibid. 
17 
makes some attempt to deal with them beyond the normal assertions found 
in law review articles. 
Another study that considers the civil liberties aspects of com-
mitment hearings was done by Dennis Wenger and C. Richard Fletcher. 3o 
They sought to determine the relationship between legal counsel and the 
decision to conunit defendants. They were non-participant observers at 
eighty-one commitment hearings at an unidentified midwestern state 
mental hospital. Sixty-five persons at the hearings they observed were 
cormnitted to the mental hospital, and sixteen were released. Of the 
sixty-five committed, four had lawyers, while eleven of the sixteen 
people not committed were represented by counse1. 31 On this basis 
they concluded that there was a high correlation between r~presentation 
by counsel and avoidance of cormnitment. Although this study gives 
some indication of the importance of counsel at commitment hearings, 
it does not deal with other rights such as trial by jury and the 
right of the defendant to be present at his hearing. 
The studies we have examined show, first, that a great deal of 
research has been done on what involuntary commitment law is. This is 
not surprising since such data are relatively easy to obtain. 
On the other hand, when we turned to an examination of the appli-
cation of involuntary conunitment law, it became apparent that the 
literature was extremely sparse. Only two studies have dealt with the 
way defendants are actually treated at their commitment hearings. 
30 . D. Wenger and c. Fletcher, nThe Effects of Legal Counsel on 
Admission to a State Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions," 
10 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 66-71 (1969). 
31rbid. 
18 
Kutner considered several aspects of the patientts·rights briefly, with 
a small amount of evidence, while Wenger and Fletcher considered a 
smaller aspect of the problem in a much more systematic manner. 
Justification for Study 
The lack of research in the area of the application of involuntary 
commitment law is the main justification for this study. Several law 
review articles tell us what the law is and that there is a great deal 
of injustice under the law as it is written. Our purpose is to present 
what Oklahoma involuntary commitment law is and attempt to show how 
the law is applied in Tulsa and Payne Counties. But this project 
cannot be justified simply because little research has been done on 
the subject. 
The main justification for this study is that it may show abuses 
of the involuntary commitment process. If citizens are being forced 
to enter mental hospitals against their will and without due process of 
law, a great injustice is being done. Such injustice cannot be correc-
ted until its existence is recognized. Thus, this study will attempt 
to determine whether the rights of those accused of insanity have been 
violated. If the rights of defendants have not been adequately 
protected, our study should indicate the extent of this significant 
but often ignored problem in Tulsa and Payne Counties. 
CHAPTER II 
OKLAHOMA INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT LAW 
Any examination of how the law is applied should begin with an 
analysis of how the law is written. Thus, before we .consider whether 
Tulsa and Payne Counties apply Oklahoma law in a way that protects the 
rights of those accused of insanity we will examine whether the law is 
written in a way that emphasizes the protection of the patient•s 
rights. Although these problems are closely related it is important 
that both be considered for a full understanding of the commitment 
process, and it should not be concluded that a finding concerning the 
expected impact of the law will be the same as the actual impact of 
the law. For example, we might find that Oklahoma law is written in a 
way th~t appears to provide full protection of the rights of those 
accused of insanity. Even if we find such apparent protection it is 
possible that our examination of the application of the law will dis-
cover ingenious methods to circumvent the law for the sake of simplic-
ity and speed at the expense of patients• rights. On the other hand, 
if w~e find that the law contains no provisions c.m::erning the protection 
of the rights of defendants we might find that in practice courts had 
protected the rights of defendants carefully. Thus, it is important 
to consider both what the law appears to be and how it is administered. 
It should be recalled that our examination of the rights of 
defendants in sanity proceedings will focus on three rights. When it 
was suggested in chapter one that we expected to find a lack of pro-
tection of these rights we asserted that this lack of protection would 
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be evident if the defendant were denied the right to counsel, the 
right to be present at his hearing, or the right to have his sanity 
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determined by a jury. We are not asserting that these are the only 
rights which defendants in connnitment proceedings should have to avoid 
connnitment of the sane, but rather that the violation of any of these 
rights will make commitment of the sane more likely. This chapter 
will elaborate upon the importance of the three rights and examine how 
Oklahoma law deals with them. 
The Right to Counsel 
The right to counsel is important for defendants accused of 
insanity since involuntary connnitment hearings are potentially complex 
legal proceedings. A lawyer can prepare the best defense because he 
has the ability to examine the statutory and case law to find those 
portions which are most favorable to his client. He can make certain 
that the state follows proper procedures and meets all legal require-
ments before depriving the accused of his liberty. The lawyer should 
not be emotionally involved in the case and usually is, as a result, 
in a better position to present a rational defense. Even a completely 
sane person faced with a charge of insanity might become angry during 
the proceeding when he was confronted with testimony against him. 
This anger could prevent his presenting the best defense ev~n if he 
had the lega 1 skill to prepare an adequate case. 
The importance of legal counsel to developing and presenting a 
good defense has been recognized for many years by the United States 
Supreme Court. Justice Sutherland made a good argument fori the impor-
tance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama that was later included in the 
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majority opinion of Gideon ~Wainwright. Justice Sutherland argued, 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, 
he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 'whether 
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may 
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue 
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he 
may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger 
of conviction because he does not know how to establish 
his own innocence.l 
It would not be an unreasonable extention of Justice Sutherland's 
argument to suggest that persons accused of mental illness also need 
legal aid to prepare their strongest defense since the process is a 
legal one. 
Justice Sutherland presented his argument in Powell ~ Alabama 
which involved defendants on trial for a capital off'ense, but the 
Court has felt that the right to counsel was important enough to 
extend that protection to less serious cases. In Argersinger v. 
Hamlin the Court pointed out that "problems associated with misde-
meanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to 
insure the accused a fair tria 1. " 2 Since the Court felt counsel to 
be essential to a fair trial they held: 
••• absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be 
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, 
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel 
at his trial.3 
1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 69 (1932). 
2Argersinger ~Hamlin, 407 U.S. 32, 36, 37 (1970). 
3 Id. at page 41. 
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With the Argersinger decision it is clear that the Court feels that the 
right to counsel is an essential part of due process in criminal pro-. 
ceedings that involve any potential imprisonm~nt. I{ .~nvoluntary 
commitment proceedings were called criminal it would be simple to con-
elude that, following the Courtis reasoning, assitance of counsel is 
a constitutional necessity. 
The question is complicated since commitment proceedings are civil 
and not designed to punish the defendant. In theory commitment is for 
the good to the patient as well as that of society. Similarly many 
states established civil juvenile proceedings to attempt to help young 
offenders. These also were not supposed to be punitive. In the case 
Re Gault the Supreme Court considered whether the good intentions of 
the state allowed it to eliminate procedural rights in juvenile pro-
ceedings. 4 In the Gault case the Court ruled that the defendant 
had a right to counsel and refused to eliminate the requirements of 
due process because of the good intentions of the state. 
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment 
requires that in respect of proceedings to determine deliquency 
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the 
juvenile•s freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must 
be notified of the child•s right to be represented by counsel 
retained by them or if they are unable to afford counsel, that 
counsel will be appointed to represent the child.5 
The same reasoning could easily be applied to mental health hearings 
since they also involve commitment to an institution that will curtail 
the individual•s freedom. 
4Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). 
5 Id. at page 41. 
Oklahoma law contains one section that deals with the right to 
counsel of persons accused of insanity. The state statutes provide: 
The County Attorneys of the several counties shall represent 
the people of the State of Oklahoma in all proceedings under 
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the Mental Health Law of the"State of Oklahoma wherein the 6 
alleged mentally ill person is represented by personal counsel. 
This is the only section of Oklahoma law that deals with the right to 
counsel of persons accused of being mentally ill. It is implied that 
a person may have counsel if he can afford it, but no provision is 
made to provide those who cannot afford to hire a lawyer with repre-
sentation. 
In the case In re Adams the Oklahoma Supreme Court provided a 
similiar interpretation of the law. 7 The facts of this case show that 
Robert Adams was traveling to Oklahofua from Texas to visit his parents. 
He was making this trip by bus and was reportedly very confused and 
exhausted. He said that his seat was bugged by political enemies that 
were trying to get information to use against him. He also claimed 
that he was working for a United States Senator from Texas. When the 
bus reached Oklahoma City the police were called, and Adams was taken 
into custody. On November 17, 1969, while in jail, he was given notice 
that a hearing on his sanity would be held the next day. Adams asked 
that his parents be contacted and that he be allowed to hire a lawyer 
before the hearing. These requests were ignored. At the hearing to 
determine his mental health he again asked that his parents be con-
tacted and that he be allowed to hire a lawyer. At the hearing his 
6 
43A Okla. Stat. sect. 4 (Supp. 1970). 
7 In re Adams, 497 P. 2d 1080 (Okla. 1972). 
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requests were ignbred, and he was found by the court to be mentally ilL 
As a consequence, he was committed to a state mental hospital. He was 
held there for over a month before he was released dn convalescent 
8 leave. 
Adams, who was employed by a Senator from Texas, had completed law 
school at the University of Texas, and was not allowed to take that 
statels bar examination when he returned because of his connnitment. 
. 9 
As a result he appealed the commitment order. The Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma ruled: 
We are of the opinion and holdthat since the appellant was 
denied the right to employ and be represented by a lawyer 
of his choice, he was denied due process of law at the 
original hearing; that under the circumstances the finding 
of the Commission was in violation of Article 2, section 7, 
of the Oklahoma Constitution which provides that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law. See also the· 14th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States for the same result. 10 
The Adams case clearly points to the need for representation by 
counsel in commitment proceedings. Adams had a great deal more 
legal training than the average citizen, yet he was unable to insure 
that his rights were protected. A lawyer representing him would have 
remained free to appeal while the mental patient is effectively 
silenced. 
Tf a person with a law degree is not in a good position to defend 
himself in commitment proceedings, how can the state expect a semi-
literate indigent, who cannot afford counsel, to represent himself 
8!bid. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
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and provide a decent defense? It seems likely that the indigent will 
be left at the mercy of those who are reviewing his sanity and will 
not be in_a position ever to appeal or alter the decision of the 
hearing--whether.it is.just or not. For this reason counsel should 
be provided by the state when the defendant cannot afford to retain 
his own lawyer. A recent article by A. Thomas Elliot supported this 
position.11 He suggested that appointment of counsel should be manda-
tory for all indigents in involuntary connnitment proceedings. 
The Right To Be Present At The Hearing 
The right of the accused to be present at his trial is one of the 
long established traditions of our lega 1 system. In 1892 the United 
States Supreme Court examined the right of the accused to be present 
at his trial and concluded in Lewis v. United States 'that it was 
essential in criminal cases. 
It is the right of anyone, when prosecuted on a capital or 
criminal charge, to be confronted with the accusers and 
witnesses, and it is within the scope of this right that 
he be present, not only when the jury are hearing his case, 
but at any subsequent s.tage when anything may be done in 
the prosecution by which he is to be affected ••• his life or 
liberty may depend upon the aid which, by his personal 
presence, he may give to counsel ••• The necessities of the 
-defense may not be met by the presence of his counsel only. 12 
The Court felt in the Lewis case that the defendant•s presence was so 
llA. Elliot, "Procedures for Involuntary Connnitment on the Basis 
of Alleged Mental Illness, rr 42 University of Colorado Law Review 
259 ( 197.0). 
12 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373, 374 (1892). 
essential to due process that neither the defendant nor his lawyer 
13 
could waive the right. 
26 
In Pointer v. Texas the United States Supreme Court extended the 
defendant•s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, 
an important part of the right to be present at one•s trial, to state 
proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 The Gault case held 
that the rights to confrontation and cross examination applied in 
juvenile proceedings even if they were called civil rather than 
i . 1 15 er mina • 
Clearly, the Supreme Court has established the right of the 
defendant to be present at his hearing so that he may confront his 
accusers and aid in his defense. This right has been extended in all 
criminal cases unless the accused forfeits the right through disruptive 
behavior or otherwise waives his right. The right has also been ruled 
. · 1 d" 16 necessary to Juveni e procee ings. While it is not always safe to 
predict what action the Court might take, it can be argued that it 
would not be inconsistent with past rulings for the Court to require 
this right in mental health commitment proceedings. 
Oklahoma law gives the two doctors and a lawyer, who meet as a 
sanity commission to determine the patient•s sanity, the power to 
exclude the defendant from his hearing. 
13Ibid. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court 
allowed the exclusion of a-defendant for disrupting his trial. 
14Pointer '::!..!..Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
15Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967). 
16 
Ibid. 
The alleged mentally ill person shall have the right to be 
present at such hearing unless it shall be made to appear 
to the court, either by the certificate of the superinten-
dent of the hos pita 1, or the physician in charge of such 
hospital, home or retreat to which he has been temporarily 
admitted, or by certificate of the Sanity Commission, as 
defined by this Act, that his condition is such as to 
render his removal for that purpose or his appearing at 
such hearing improper and unsafe. If such person shall 
be found and adjudged to be mentally ill, the court or the 
judge thereof shall immediyfelY issue an order for his 
admission to the hospital. 
Unfortunately this section is so vaguely written that the commission 
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does not have to present a well-9efined reason to exclude a defendant 
from his hearing. The implication is that a person can be kept away 
from his sanity hearing if he is dangerous. 
There are several areas of potential abuse under this section of 
the Ol.dahoma statutes. First, if a sane person were excluded from 
his hearing and his case were decided, by a jury, the defendant's 
rational behavior at the trial could be his best defense. Second, 
if a defendant is represented by counsel and he is not allowed to 
attend his hearing he will have no way to assist in his own defense or 
to determine whether his lawyer actually represented his interests. 
Finally, under Oklahoma law since the right to counsel is not 
adequately protected it is important that a defendant be allowed to 
attend his hearing .since if he is absent no one will represent his 
interests. Without any defense, commitment could well be more likely, 
and the potential that sane persons might be committed seems greater. 
These points lead us to the conclusion that the right of the defendant 
to appear at his hearing should be carefully protected. This pro-
tection is not provided by Oklahoma law. 
1743A Okla. Stat. Sect. 55 (Supp. 1970). 
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The Right To A Jury Trial 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the 
protection of the right to a jury trial in most criminal cases while 
the Seventh Amendment insures the right to a jury trial in most civil 
cases. In Singer ~United States the Supreme Court suggested, rrThe 
jury trial clause was clearly designed to protect the accused from 
oppression by the government.11 18 Trials could be used to silence 
opposition to the government if only government officials were involved 
in the decision of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Jury members 
may be more sympathetic with the accused since they may be able to 
visualize themselves in his position if the government seems to -Oe 
prosecuting a weak or unfair case. Thus, the Supreme Court decioed in 
Duncan v. Louisiana that the right to a jury trial is sufficiently 
significant to be required as an ingredient of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and is applicable to state criminal trials. 19 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled that 
states must provide jury trials in civil cases, that requirement is 
present in the Oklahoma Constitution. Article III section 19 states 
that rrthe right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate. 11 Be-
cause of this provision in the Oklahoma Constitution, it is not 
surprising that one of the few protections provided for defendants 
accused of insanity under Oklahoma law is that they have the right to 
a jury trial if they request it. The law says: 
18singer ~United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
19nuncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145; 157 (1968). 
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If the court or judge thereof shall deem it necessary, or 
if such alleged mentally ill person, or any relative, friend, 
or any person with whom he may reside, or at whose house he 
may be, shall so demand, a jury of six (6) fre~holders having 
the qualifications required of jurors in courts of record, 
shall be suz:nmoned to determine the question of mental illness. 20 
The strength of this section is that it provides an important pro-
cedural safeguard. Any time a defendant diSMgrees with the decision of 
the Sanity Commission he has the right to have his case heard by a jury. 
In theory the jury would have to be convinced that the defendant is 
mentally ill. This could be advantageous, for the defendant, compared 
to a hearing before administrators of the system who might already be 
convinced the person is siek. 
Unfortunately, when this provision is considered in conjuction 
with the lack of other vital procedural safeguards, it seems less 
impressive. For example, it seems ,unlikely that persons will know 
that they can demand a jury trial unless they have been able to hire a 
lawyer. Thus, for the indigent who cannot afford a lawyer the right 
to a jury may have little meaning in practice. Trial by jury also 
could be meaningless if the defendant could not afford a lawyer artd 
was excluded from his hearing. 
While trial by jury is an important right, it must be allowed in 
conjunction with other rights for its protection of .the defendant to 
be significant. A lawyer should be provided to develop and present 
a strong case, and the defendant nrust be allowed to attend his 
-· 
hearing. With these protections the right to a jury trial becomes 
much more meaningful. 
20 43A Okla. Stat. Sect. 55 (Supp. 1970). 
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In summary, our examination of the right to counsel, right to be 
present at the hearing, and the right to jury trial indicates that 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court recognize the importance 
of the protection of the rights even though they have not dealt specif-
ically with the problem of mental health commitment proceedings. In 
one instance the action of the United States Supreme Court is not so 
vital to a person subject to Oklahoma civil commitment jurisdiction 
because the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Oklahoma 
Constitution and applicable statutes. Relative to the right of the 
defendant to be present at his hearing and right to counsel, Oklahoma 
law provides less protection, and it is conceivable that a United 
States Supreme Court ruling might require greater protection of these 
rights. Absent greater protection, it appears that under Oklahoma 
law a person could be committed without being provided with assistance 
of counsel or being allowed to attend his own hearing. Under such 
circumstances it would be very easy to commit a person, sane or insane, 
without following the legal procedures required by Oklahoma law. To 
avoid this danger those accused of insanity should be given greater 
protection under Oklahoma law. 
As mentioned earlier, we cannot assume that sane persons are 
committed because Oklahoma law does not provide for arguably essential 
procedural safeguards. It is possible that those who administer the 
law provide protection for patients, such as providing for assistance 
of counsel, even though they are not legally obligated to do so. To 
determine whether procedural safeguards are applied we must test our 
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hypothesis that "involuntary corrnnitment proceedings in Tulsa and Payne 
Counties do not apply Oklahoma law in a way that adequately protects 
the rights of those accused of insanity." 
CHAPTER III 
INVOLUNTARY CCMMITMENT IN PAYNE COONTY 
The Process 
Information was obtained on fourteen commitment hearings that 
occurred between August 20, 1973 and May 22, 1974 in Payne County. 1 
Certain similarities appea~ed in all fourteen hearings. In twelve 
cases the hearing was conducted in the chambers of Judge Leon York. 
In one case no formal hearing was held prior to commitmen~ and in 
another the hearing of a potentially violent patient was held in jail. 
Thus, except in unusual cases the hearings were held in the privacy 
of the judgers chambers. Judge York took a leading role in question-
ing the patient along with the commissipn doctors who do not examine 
the patient prior to the hearing. 2 In a focused interview, Jeff 
Sinderson, the Payne County Psychiatric Social Worker, indicated that 
the hearings he attended between August 20, 1973 and March 5, 1974 
1Information on eight hearings was obtained by interviewing Mr. 
Jeff Sinder~on, Payne County Psychiatric Social Worker, on March 8, 
1974. He provided information from his files ·for Stillwater hearings 
that occurred on August 20, 1973, September 1974, November 1973, 
January 3, 1974, January 15, 1974, February 14, 1974, and March 5, 
1974. He also provided information on a November 1974 hearing that was 
held in Cushing. Hearings were attended by the author on March 22, 
1974, April 11, 1974 and May 9, 1974 in Stillwater and on March 20, 
1974 in Cushing. Jeff Sinderson filled out observation forms after 
attending two hearings on May 22, 1974 in Stillwater. 
2 Interview with Jeff Sinderson, Payne County Psychiatric Social 
Worker, in Stillwater, Oklahoma, March 8, 1974. 
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normally lasted from twenty to forty-five minutes.3 Observation 
indicated that the hearings lasted from five minutes to thirty minutes 
with the average hearing length being twenty minutes. The actual 
examination of the patient was shorter since the hearing time included 
five to ten minutes for the commission members to fill out several 
forms. 
Of the fourteen persons examined under the Oklahoma commitment 
procedures between August 1973 and May 1974, eleven were determined 
to be mentally ill and were committed, two were found to be mentally 
competent and were released, and in one case no determination was 
4 
made at the hearing. These results, and the procedures by which 
they were reached, wi 11 be examined to determine whether the require-
ments of assistance of counsel, trial by jury, and the presence of the 
accused at his own hearing, determined in the preceding chapter to be 
vital to a fair hearing, were met. We will examine these three rights 
as they relate to our hypothesis that "involuntary commitment proceed-
ings in Tulsa and Payne Counties do not apply Oklahoma law in a way 
that adequately protects the rights of those accused of insanity.11 
The results of this examination will show that in the fourteen Payne 
3rbid .• 
4 
The accused in this case had been voluntarily committed on 
several earlier occasions. Central State Hospital sent a letter 
that was discussed at .the hearing saying that the accused did not 
need hospitalization, and that if she were corranitted she would be 
immediately released. One commission doctor felt the accused should 
be committed. This conflict left the corranission unable to reach 
a decision, and the case was passed. 
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County commitment hearings there was a general lack of concern for the 
protection of these rights. Our hypothesis will therefore be con-
firmed in Payne County. 
Right to Counsel 
The first aspect of the hearings to be considered is whether the 
persons whose sanity was to be determined were effectively guaranteed 
the right to c.ounsel. The most obvious indicator of this right would 
be the presence of counsel representing the accused, but even this 
indicator may be misleading. In only one of the fourteen hearings was 
the defendant even arguably represented by counsel. 
In this case the defendant told the psychiatric social worker for 
Payne County during an interview prior to the hearing that he would 
have legal representation at his sanity hearing. 5 The man•s father 
was attempting to have him committed and testified at the hearing 
that his son had not been handling his financial affairs properly, 
which was the only evidence of mental illness. 6 A lawyer did come to 
the hearing who was normally the father•s lawyer, and he provided the 
court with information regarding the defendant•s assets. It is hard 
to classify this lawyer as the defendant•s since he did nothing to 
def end the son at the hearing. That he provided no defense is best 
illustrated by the fact that when the commission ignored the son•s 
request that his sanity be determined by a jury, the lawyer did not 
react in any way. A lawyer who was attempting to defend his client at 
5 Supra, note 2. 
6Ibid. 
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least would have provided support for this request by the defendant 
because he is guaranteed the right to have his sanity determined by a 
jury under state law. 7 Thus, even in this instance, it does not appear 
that the defendant enjoyed the advocacy that is presumed to be present 
when one is represented by counsel. 
Beyond the presence of counsel, one may examine whether persons 
accused of insanity were given notice of their right to hire counsel 
of their choice if they are financially able to do so, a right which 
8 is guaranteed by the laws of Oklahoma. This allows a more accurate 
evaluation of our observations because at least some of the defen-
dants might have waived the right to counsel. 9 To examine this we 
recorded whether defendants were informed that they had the right to 
hire a lawyer to represent them at their sanity hearing. Of the 
fourteen defendants only one was told that he had the right to obtain 
legal counsel. Twelve of the fourteen hearings occurred in 
Stillwater. Two of them occurred in Cushing, Oklahoma. The same 
lawyer and doctors serve on the sanity conunissi6ns at Stillwater 
hearings. It was at one of the Cushing hearings that a lawyer who 
does not normally serve on Payne County sanity commissions informed 
10 
a defendant that he had the right to counsel. Interestingly, at a 
second Cushing hearing involving the same lawyer, the judge, who 
7supra.Chapter 2, note 21. 
8 Supra. Chapter 2, note 6. 
9It could be argued that any defendant who is found to be insane 
could not have made an intelligent waiver of the right. 
10 Supra. note 2. 
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never had informed patients of their right to hire counsel in 
Stillwater hearings, told those present that he would inform the 
absent defendant that he had the right to counsel if the defendant 
were at the hearing. 11 Since the defendant was not present at the 
hearing the judgets conunent by itself did nothing to protect his 
rights. 
As we have seen, protection of the defendantrs right to counsel 
was almost totally lacking in Payrte County during the period of study. 
Only one of fourteen defendants was informed of his right to hire a 
lawyer, while no defendant enjoyed effective representation. This 
represents a failure of Oklahoma law since a right that is guaranteed 
Oklahomans is being ignored in Payne County sanity hearings. 
Juey Trial 
Since Oklahoma law provides that defendants in sanity hearings 
have the right to have their sanity determined by a jury we expected 
to find some cases where the defendant chose a jury trial. This was 
expected since the jury would be assembled at no cost to the defendant. 
Thus, an indigent who could not afford to hire counsel might have a 
jury trial. Our Payne County data indicated that none of the de-
fendants had his case heard before a jury. This can be explained in 
part by the fact that in all but one case the conunissions did not tell 
the defendants that they had the right to a jury hearing. For these 
defendants who did not have legal counsel this provision of Oklahoma 
11The judger s comment could have been for the benefit of the 
Cushing lawyer who informed a patient of his right to counsel at an 
earlier hearing. 
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law is probably meaningless.12 Certainly it appears that the com-
mission lawyer should tell defendants that they have this right if it 
is to be expected that the right will have any meaning in practice. 
Thus, in Payne County, since defendants are not informed that they 
have a right to a jury trial it is not surprising that no jury trials 
occurred during the period of observation. Interestingly, one defen-
dant did ask that his sanity be determined by a jury. This case 
involved that man we mentioned earlier who thought he was represented 
by counse1. 13 When he asked for a jury trial his request was ignored 
by the sanity commission. When the facts of the case are considered 
it is difficult not to wonder whether a jury might have reached a 
different decision than the commission. 
The defendant.was a thirty-five year old geologist who was 
between jobs. When the father sought his sonis commitment he argued 
that his son's irrational behavior was illustrated by the purchase of 
land and personal items he did not need. As an example of the ir-
rational behavior, the father told about a car his son had sold at a 
price less than its actual value. 14 If poor handling of financial 
affairs is grounds for commitment a large portion of the population 
might be in jeopardy. As was the case in all sanity hearings observed, 
the father did not testify under oath, and no effort was made to find 
12we are assuming that patients are not aware of this right with-
out any supporting evidence. We did not interview defendants to 
determine their level of information concerning commitment law. The 
assumption does not seem unreasonable. 
13 
Supra. note 2. 
14 
Ibid. 
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other witnesses to support his testimony. The fatheris testimony 
concerning the sonts handling of his financial affairs was the only 
basis for corrnnitment, and there was no evidence or claim that the 
defendant was dangerous to himself or anyone else. Given these facts 
a jury might have found the defendant sane. Thus, Payne Countyts 
refusal to allow a jury trial might have had significant consequences 
for the geologist who was committed to a private mental hospital. 
Even though all the cases are not so dramatic as the illegal 
denial of a requested right, all Payne County defendants, with one 
exception, were effectively denied their right to a jury trial because 
they were not informed of that right. The lack of notice of the right 
plus the denial of the right when it was requested left a total 
absence of jury trials in Payne County involuntary commitment proceed-
ings. 
Defendant's Presence At Hearings 
Oklahoma law provides that defendants can be excluded from their 
15 
sanity hearings when the commission thinks it is advisable. Of the 
fourteen hearings on which we have information two defendants were not 
present at their hearing. In both cases the defendant was hospitalized 
In a case involving an eighty-two year old man the decision to corrnnit 
took only five minutes, and most of that time was spent filling out 
papers to pay the corrnnission members for their participation in the 
hearing. This hearing was a formality that did not provide a chance 
for the defendant to stop improper corrnnitment. While it may be true 
15 Supra. Chapter 2 note 18. 
39 
that the defendant could not have understood the nature of the hearing, 
I it seems the hearing could have been held in the hospital to make'. 
sure that the defendant had a chance to protest his commitment. This 
would not be that much of an inconvenience to commission members and 
would not be inconsistent with their past behavior since they held one 
commitment hearing in jail so a violent defendant:could be present. 
Although no harm may have been done in the case of the eighty-two 
year old in the hospital, the potential for improper commitment is 
great if the defendant is excluded from his hearing. It would be 
easy for the commission to avoid any possibility of abuse by holding 
the hearing in the presence of the defendant whenever possible. 
In the second case, involving a sixty year old woman with a long 
history of mental illness, the commisssion decided that the woman was 
not in a condition to understand the nature of the proceeding and that 
she should not attend her hearing. This information was obtained prior 
to arrival at the courthouse for her hearing that was scheduled for 
that day at 1:30. When Judge Couch, who was to preside over the 
hearing, was approached he said that the hearing had been cancelled 
because Judge York had already signed the commitment order. In this 
case Judge York apparently decided that since the defendant was not 
going to be at the hearing and no one would be there to defend her 
the formal hearing should be omitted. 
The result probably would not have been any different if a commit-
ment hearing had been held. That may be the most frightening part of 
the process. It appears that the rights of the patient are so limited 
that in many cases the commitment hearing is a meaningless formality 
required by law. The unfortunate part of the situation is that the 
commitment hearing provides the best and possibly only opportunity 
for the defendant to argue that he should not be committed. 
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The result is that some defendants never have a chance to defend 
themselves. In two of the fourteen cases this was true because the 
defendants were excluded from their hearings. When this exclusion is 
combined with the facts that neither patient had legal counsel to 
represent him and his commitment was sought by his family, it is 
difficult to imagine who else might be available to provide a defense. 
In the two Payne County hearings no defense was provided the defendants 
that were excluded from their hearing. 
In another case the defendant was denied the right to confront 
his accusers which is a significant part of the right to be pres~nt at 
the hearing. This case involved the attempt by a woman to have her 
husband committed. She asked the court not to tell her husband that 
she had requested his connnitment, and the court honored her request. 
The danger of this practice is that the defendant will not have a 
chance to tell the court what improper motives a person might have 
for seeking his commitment if he does not know who signed the request 
that he be committed. For example, he may have done something 
recently that upset the person even though it did not provide grounds 
for commitment. An angry wife might seek her husband•s commitment if 
she caught him with another woman to punish him for his conduct. This 
is clearly an improper use of the commitment process, and it is 
important that the identity of the person seeking commitment be known 
to the defendant so the motives of the petitioner can be examined 
along with the sanity of the defendant. 
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Other Observations 
Another civil right that is important to defendants who are 
facing the commitment process is that they be given proper notice 
before their hearing. Notice is important so the defendant will have 
a chance to obtain counsel or prepare his own defense if he is not 
going to hire a lawyer. Oklahoma law requires that twenty-four hours 
notice be given the defendant prior to the hearing. Initially this 
was an area that we wanted to examine in each commitment hearing, but 
it was soon discovered that the information was not available from a 
reliable source and could not be found by observing hearings. Since 
notice was served prior to the hearing, it was difficult to determine 
during the hearing whether the statutory requirement had been met. 
In one case it became obvious that the defendant had not been 
given notice prior to the hearing. This case invol~ed an eighty year 
old man with arteriosclerosis. This is the same man who was informed 
that he had a right to counsel and jury trial at his hearing. During 
his hearing the man•s son, who was seeking the man•s commitment, told 
the commission that he had not told his father that he was having a 
commitment hearing because he was afraid he would not come to the 
hearing if he knew about it in advance. Because of this, he told his 
father that they had to go to the courthouse on other business and 
brought his father to the hearing without any notice. 
This lack of notice is a clear violation of the applicable 
Oklahoma statute, which provides: 
Upon receiving such petition the court, or judge thereof, 
shall fix a day for the hearing thereof, and shall forthwith 
appoint a Sanity Commission, as defined in this Act, to make 
an examination of the alleged mentally ill person, whose 
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certificate shall be filed with the court on or before such 
hearing. Notice in writing of such petition and the time 
and place of hearing thereon shall be served personally at 
least one (1) day before the hearing, upon the person alleged 
to be mentally ill.16 
The importance of the notice provision is that it gives the patient 
an opportunity to consider his situation, plan a defense, and obtain 
counsel. If the defendant is placed in the hearing without notice, he 
must present a defense without the advantage of prior preparation. 
Under such conditions the chances of presenting a defense are greatly 
reduced. In Payne County this was allowed to occur in one hearing in 
clear violation of Oklahoma law, even though the judge presiding at 
the hearing realized the lack of notice on the basis of facts freely 
admitted by the patientrs son at the hearing.17 
The rights of patients are clearly violated by the Payne County 
involuntary commitment process. In one of the cases that was observed 
by the Payne County Psychiatric Social Worker, Jeff Sinderson, the 
improper use of the commitment process was illustrated. A sixteen 
year old boyrs parents were t~ying to have their son committed because 
18 
they did not want him. He previously had been in a private mental 
hospital, and the parents were now seeking his commitment to a state 
mental hospital because their insurance money had run out. According 
to commission comments at the hearing the members seemed to feel the 
boy needed 19 a new set of parents more than mental help. 
16 43A Okla. Stat. sect. 55 (Supp. 1970). 
17 
Supra. note 2. 
18 Ibid. 
19Ibid. 
In this case 
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the boy was committed with the understanding that he would remain in 
the mental hospital until a foster home could be found for him. He 
was sent to the hospital on August 20, 1973 and was not released until 
October 5, 1973. During this time he did not receive any psychiatric 
20 treatment. Thus, in this case the commitment process was used to 
provide storage for an unwanted boy until a foster home could be 
found. This is a questionable use of state commitment law, and it 
seems likely that a jury might not have ordered it. Thus, the viola-
tion of rights that took place in this case led to a highly question-
able. commitment decision. 
Beyond the violation of rights, Payne County commitment pro-
ceedings also involved a great deal of unnecessary insensitivity on 
the part of some commission members. During one hearing the judge 
mentioned that he had always noticed a rash of "thiS type" of problem 
this time of year. He also suggested that the full moon might be the 
cause of insanity. One of the doctors added, that is why they call 
them "lunatics." The judge then asked the defendant whether she 
thought the moon had anything to do with her problem. She did ndt 
respond. After a return to the business of the hearing the judge 
again brought up his suggestion that insanity was caused by the season 
and the phase of the moon. The judge gave no indication that he was 
joking.· The defendant made one of the more sane comments when she 
said that she thought everyone was a little bit crazy. Not only was 
this discussion totally irrelevant to the busines~ of the hearing, it 
was totally insensitive to the feelings of the defendant. 
201bid. 
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Our examination of the rights of those accused of insanity in 
Payne County confirms our hypothesis. We found that defendants were 
not informed of their right to counsel or their right to a jury tria 1. 
In one case when the defendant asked for a. jury trial the corrnnission 
ignored the request. We found that most defendants attended thefr 
hearing even though the corrnnission occasionally excluded a hospital-
ized patient from his hearing. The following table surrnnarizes our 
observations. 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENCE OF THE PROTECTION OF PATIENTS! RIGHTS 
PAYNE COUNTY 
Informed of Informed of Defendant 
Right to Obtained Right to Jury Trial Present at 
Case* Counsel Counsel Jury Trial Occurred Hearing 
Case A x 
Case B x 
Case c x 
Case D x x x 
Case E x 
Case F x x 
Case G x 
Case H x 
Case I 
Case J 
Case K x 
Case L x 
Case M x 
Case N x 
*Cases are presented in chronological order. Each X indicates the 
protection of a patients' right. 
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Beyond the widespread violation of patients! rights that is illus-
trated by Table I, other violations developed during the period of 
study. In one case the fact that the patient did not receive legally 
required notice prior to his hearing was apparent. In another case no 
hearing was held prior to the connnitment of a patient. 
As our data demonstrate, violations of patients! rights occurred 
so frequently in Payne County as to make it easy to use the commitment 
process improperly. It should be recalled that one man was committed 
for handling his financial affairs improperly while a child was 
committed until a foster home could be found. These were, at best, 
questionable uses of the connnitment process that would be less likely 
under a system that provided full protection of the rights of the 
patient. 
CHAPTER IV 
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT IN TULSA COUNTY 
The Process 
Between August 21, 1974 and March 21, 1975 twenty-one involun-
1 
tary conunitment proceedings were observed in Tulsa County. Regulari-
ties appeared during the observation. No patient was told that he had 
a right to counsel or trial by jury during the hearing, although in 
each case a sanity connnission lawyer told the judge that the defendant 
had been fully informed of his legal rights during a separate examina-
tion held prior to the formal hearing. The separat~on of the examina-
tion and the hearing was another aspect of the process that occurred 
in every hearing. None of the defendants observe~ in Tulsa had his 
sanity determined by a jury. 
All formal hearings in Tulsa were held in open court. The 
sanity connnission lawyer attended the hearings to present the 
connnissionts decision to the judge. As he presented the connnissionrs 
report on the defendant, he told the judge that the rights of the 
patient had been fully explained and protected during the examination. 
In each case the judge briefly examined the report and then announced 
the commissionts decision to the patient who was seated with spectators 
1Hearings were observed in Tulsa County by the author on August 
21, 1974, January 24, 1975, February 7, 1975, February 14, 1975, 
February 28, 1975, March 10, 1975, March 12, 1975, March 14, 1975 and 
March 21, 1974. 
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in the courtroom. In some cases the judge made a friendly connnent to 
the patient after announcing the connnissionts decision. For example, 
he might say that the patient should be out of the hospital soon, or 
he might wish the patient good luck. In some cases he told persons 
who were not connnitted that he hoped they would get some help on 
their own. In each case when the judge spoke to patients he was 
compassionate and friendly. 
The most striking aspect of the connnitment hearings observed in 
Tulsa County was their procedural uniformity. The process always 
involved a quick formalization of the sanity cpnnnissionts decision, 
taking from three to five minutes. In some cases the uniformity was 
subtly altered by the appearance or actions of the patient. This 
occurred in two cases in which the patients were in chains during 
their hearings to prevent them from connnitting any violent behavior. 
The chains were noticeable as the patients came into the courtroom 
and remained obvious as they rattled on the courtroom's wooden seats. 
The uniformity also seemed lost in a case involving an Arab student 
from the University of Tulsa who loudly tore up a copy of the Tulsa 
County Legal News during his short hearing. Despite these diversions 
the legal process was the same in all hearings to a'courtroom observer. 
The following table shows the outcome of 1974 connnitment hearings in 
Tulsa County. 
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TABLE II 
TULSA COUNTY CCl1MITMENT DECISIONS DURING 1974 
Involuntary Voluntary 
Period Cases Commitments Commitments Dismissals 
January 41 20 3 16 
February 45 30 5 10 
March 40 19 4 19 
April 39 23 2 13 
May 33 21 2 9 
June 26 16 3 5 
July 33 19 4 6 
August 37 24 1 13 
September 38 21 3 13 
October 44 30 2 13 
November 29 15 2 10 
December 32 21 1 9 
Total 437 259 32 136 
Source: Tulsa County Court Records, Monthly Sunmiary Sheets. 
Table II indicates that approximately sixty-one per cent of those 
who go through the commitment process in Tulsa County are involuntarily 
cormnitted. For every voluntary commitment that occured in Tulsa County 
Court eight people were committed involuntarily. Our concern is 
whether the court in Tulsa County protected the rights of the indi-
viduals who lost their liberty through the commitment process. Table II 
provides some encouragement since a substantial number of people who 
were accused of insanity were found to be sane, but the process must be 
examined in more detail to determine whether those who were committed 
were afforded their right to counsel, their right to a jury trial 
and their right to be present at their hearing~ 
Right to Counsel 
Despite the fact that state law does not require the provision 
of counsel for indigent defendants at sanity hearings, lawyers are 
2 provided any defendant who requests legal aid in Tulsa County. 
Despite this opportunity for counsel, only nineteen per cent of the 
defendants had legal representation at the hearings we observed. Of 
the four defendants who had lawyers only one was indigent. Thus, 
eighty-one per cent of the defendants in Tulsa County did not have 
legal counsel even though it was supposed to be available. 
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The low percentage of representation by counsel may be explained 
if some defendants are not informed of their right to counsel. Since 
the Tulsa commitment process is divided into two parts, each must 
be considered as a place for the explanation of legal rights. During 
the hearing phase of the process no defendant was warned of his 
right to counsel. At each hearing the commission lawyer did tell 
the court that he had fully explained the defendantts rights during 
the examination. Since the percentage of patients that have counsel 
is only nineteen per cent, it is questionable whether the commission 
lawyers are doing an adequate job explaining the right to counsel 
during the examination. Only further study that focuses on the 
examination phase rather than the hearing phase of the process can 
2 
Interview with M.M. McDougal, District Judge, in Tulsa 
Oklahoma, March 10, 1975. 
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determine how fully the rights of the defendant are explained. Logi-
cally it could be argued that this would vary from examination to 
examination depending on which lawyer was serving on the sanity 
commission. Some lawyers might take this responsibility more seriously 
than others. 
Jury l'rial 
Because defendants in Tulsa were supposed to b~ warned of their 
legal rights, including the right to a jury trial, we expected to 
find that jury trials were a connnon event in Tulsa County. Court 
records indicate that during 1974 thirteen jury trials were held. 
This represents slightly less than three per cent of the four hundred 
thirty-seven cases during that period. This percentage is surpris-
ingly low because persons who are connnitted through the involuntary 
process normally object to their connnitment, and they have the right 
to request a jury trial after the sanity commission has reached its 
decision. Thus, if the commission decides to commit a defendant, he 
has a chance to appeal the connnissionts decision to a jury. Since 
this option does not cost the defendant anything financially, it is 
remarkable that more defendants do not request jury trials. 
One reason for the low number of jury trials may be that 
defendants are not being informed of their right to a jury trial. In 
one case, prior to the formal hearing the mother of a teenage boy who 
was about to be connnitted was talking with the commission lawyer. She 
seemed to feel guilty because she was asking for her sonts commitment 
and seemed to seek reassurance from the commission lawyer that her 
son was being treated properly. In the conversation the lawyer 
mentioned that his job on the commission was to make sure that the 
rights of the patient were protected. He suggested that, as an 
example, he would tell the patient that he had the right to a jury 
trial. The father of the boy then asked the lawyer whether he had 
been told he could have a jury trial. The lawyer said that it had 
not been necessary to tell their son of this right since he was 
. 3 
cooperative. When Judge McDougal was asked in an interview about 
this situation he was upset by it and said that the lawyer should 
always tell the defendant what his rights are even if he is cooper-
4 
ative. 
Interestingly, the boy whom the lawyer characterized as cooper-
ative was brought to court in chains to restrain him. Assuming that 
the lawyer felt the young man was cooperative and would not have 
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wanted a jury trial, why was it necessary to bring the boy into court 
in restraint? The answer may be in the medication that he was 
receiving. It is a common practice for patients in Tulsa County to 
5 
be held at the Tulsa Psychiatric Center prior to their hearing. 
For humanitarian reasons this may be better than holding the patients 
in jail prior to their hearing, but it can create legal problems since 
patients are forced to receive treatment before their commitment 
6 
hearing. Judge McDougal admitt·ed that this was a common practice. 
3The author heard this conversation while waiting for the hearing 
to begin. 
4 
Supra. note 2. 
5 Interview with Dr. B. J. Byrd, psychiatrist, Tulsa Psychiatric 
Center, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, August 13, 1974. 
6 Supra. note 2. 
In some cases he suggested that defendants who would have been com-
mitted without any treatment improved enough during their treatment 
prior to their hearing to avoid commitment. 7 Part of the treatment, 
according to Dr. Byrd of the Tulsa Psychiatric Center, is the use of 
drugs that tend to make the patient more "cooperative.;" Dr. Byrd 
suggested the patients were more cooperative because they could 
think rationally and see what was best for them. 8 
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This may may explain why in some cases patients who are normally 
opposed to their commitment might not resist commitment at their 
hearing. This practice in Tulsa County may not appear to be so abusive 
of the accusedts rights as the refusal to allow a jury trial, but it-
has the same impact, Further study is needed to determine how singifi-
cant this problem is in Tulsa County. 
The importance of fully protecting the right to a jury trial is 
illustrated by the few jury trials that took place in Tulsa County 
during 1974. Of the thirteen jury trials the patient was committed 
9 in nine cases and released in four cases. This means that approxi-
mately thirty per cent of the patients who demanded a jury trial were 
found sane even though the commission doctors felt they should be 
committed. Thus, regardless of the reason so few jury trials occur 
in Tulsa County commitment proceedings, it is clear that when the 
7 
Ibid. 
8 Supra. note 4. 
9 . The information on jury trials was obtained by examining the 
calendar of the Tulsa County Commissioner of Mental Health, Pat 
Williams, and then checking the courtts docket on days that jury 
trials were indicated to find the juryts decision. 
patient does not have a jury trial he loses a significant chance to 
have the commission•s decision to commit him reversed. 
Defendant•s Presence At Hearings 
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During the period of observation the defendant was not present at 
two hearings. According to Judge McDougal the only proper reason for 
not allowing the defendant to attend his hearing was that he was 
hospitalized and restricted to bed. 10 Potential violence was not an 
acceptable reason for excluding the patient from his hearing. Two 
cases were observed where potentially violent patients were brought 
into the courtroom in physical restraint rather than be excluded from 
their hearing. 
In the two cases involving exclusion of the defendant from his 
hearing one commitment occurred. A defendant who was not present at 
his hearing and lacked legal counsel was in a particularly vulnerable 
position. On the other hand, since no defendant involved in a Tulsa 
hearing said anything in his own defense during the formal commitment 
hearing, the exclusion was not so significant. 
Apparently the patient•s only opportunity to affect the outcome 
of his hearing is at his examination. The only exception to this would 
be if the patient felt he had been unjustly treated and protested 
during his formal hearing. Although this did not occur in the observed 
cases, it is a possibility for defendants who are present at their 
10 Supra. note 2. 
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hearing. Judge McDougal indicated that he would listen to any comments 
made by the defendant during the hearing even though this is not 
encouraged. 11 
Other Observations 
One aspect of the Tulsa County commitment process that was not 
covered in our discussion of the process and the three rights is very 
interesting. This is the judgers use of his detention power under 
Oklahoma's mental health law. The statute states: 
Pending such proceeding for admission into the hospital, 
if it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the 
County Court of the judge thereof, upon medical evidence 
or other competent testimony, that the alleged mentally 
ill person is violent or his condition is such.that he may 
injure himself or others, then the court or judge thereof 
may order to be issued an order directed to the sheriff 
or other peace officer within the county in which such peti-
tion is filed, for the detention of such alleged mentally 
ill person in some suitable place, until such petition can 
be heard and determined; provided, however, that the period 
of such temporary detention shall not exceed thirty (30) 
days.12 
Judge McDougal used his detention power to require the treatment 
of patients at the Tulsa Psychiatric Center whom the doctors believed 
might be helped in a short period of time. The requirement in the 
statute that the patient be dangerous to himself or others was ig-
13 
nored. 
The judge used his detention power in this manner because he 
feels a less drastic solution than involuntary commitment is needed in 
11lbid. 
12 43A Okla. Stat. sect. 55 (Supp 1970). 
13 Supra. note 2. 
some cases. During an interview Judge McDougal suggested that his 
experimentation with the detention provision may stretch the law 
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some, but it is necessary to develop case studies to show to the state 
legislature before seeking a change in the law. One advantage that 
the judge cited for his use of detention in place of cormnitment was 
that no cormnitment record was required. The process was called 
semi-voluntary by Judge McDougal since the patient's consent is 
required by him before he :inay use detention for treatment purposes. 
Once the patient has agreed to detention, he may be required to receive 
treatment for thirty days. 14 If the patients are fully informed of 
their alternatives, this use of the statets detention law may be to 
some patients I benefit. On the other hand, if the court ever used deten-
tion for defendants that the cormnission felt needed help but were not 
ill enough to be conunitted, the use of detention would violate the 
rights of the patient, depriving them of liberty without due process 
of law. 
Two hundred fifty-nine defendants in Tul.sa, County commitment 
hearings were deprived of their liberty. Our examination of the pro-
cess by which these persons were committed indicates that the rights 
of these patients were not adequately protected. Patients normally 
attended their conunitment hearings in Tulsa County, being excluded 
only in cases of hospitalization for some type of illness, as was the 
case in Payne County. Of the two defendants out of twenty-one who 
were excluded from their hearings, one had counsel and one did not. 
14rbid. 
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The patient without counsel was committed. Only four defendants were 
represented by counsel. No def end.mt was informed of his legal 
rights during his commitment hearing. The following table summarizes 
the protection of patients! rights in Tulsa County commitment hearings. 
TABLE III 
SUMMARY OF THE INCIDENCE OF THE PROTECTION OF PATIENTSt RIGHTS 
WLSA COUNTY 
Case* 
PMH 74-275 
PMH 74-276 
PMH 74-277 
PMH 7 5-25 
PMH 75-46 
PMH 7 5-47 
PMH 75-48 
PMH 75-39 
PMH 75-54 
PMH 75-74 
PMH 7 5-7 5 
PMH 7 5-87 
PMH 75-88 
PMH 75-89 
PMH 7 5-90 
PMH 75-91 
PMH 75-92 
PMH 75-93 
PMH 75-94 
PMH 75-99 
PMH 75-100 
Informed of 
Right to 
Counsel 
Obtained 
Counsel 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Informed of 
Right to 
Jury Trial 
Jury Trial 
Occurred 
Defendant 
Present at 
Hearing 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
*Cases are presented as they appeared on the docket of the Tulsa 
County Court. 
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Despite the more sophisticated nature of the Tulsa commitment 
process, it is clear that the patients' rights were not fully protected 
An effective right to counsel was lacking in eighty-one per cent of 
the cases observed. Only three per cent of the defendants had their 
sanity determined by a jury. Interestingly, juries refused to commit 
thirty per cent of the defendants who had jury trials even though the 
doctors on the sanity corrnnission would have ordered corrnnitment. Thus, 
it could be argued that the jury trial is a significant protection 
that more defendants should enjoy. The lack of protection that was 
apparent in Tulsa County•s commitment process confirms our hypothesis 
that "involuntary commitment proceedings in Tulsa and Payne Counties 
do not apply the law in a way that adequately protects the rights of 
those accused of insanity." 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
Involuntary commitment inherently involves limiting the liberty 
of the person committed~ Since our Constitution provides, in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, that no person shall be deprived of liberty 
without due process of law, we decided to examine the involuntary 
commitment process to see whether the rights of defendants are 
adequately protected. Before beginning our inquiry the research of 
others was considered. 
In our review of the literature we found several articles that 
examined the way involuntary commitment laws are written and the 
expected impact this would have on the rights of those accused of 
insanity. The best· article of this type was an American Bar Associ-
ation report authored by Brakel and Rock which provided an excellent 
summary of each statets commitment law. The main weakness of this 
type of research is that it does not tell how the law is being 
administered. 
Two studies considered this problem. Kutner concluded that the 
rights of patients are violated by the Cook County, Illinois,commit-
ment process after interviewing a judge and a social worker and 
reviewing three newspaper articles. Wenger and Fletcher examined a 
small part of the problem in a more systematic manner. They were 
concerned about the impact of counsel on the commitment decision. 
58 
Using non-participant observation of commitment hearings, they con-
cluded that defendants who were represented by counsel were less 
likely to be committed. 
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After considering the literature we decided to examine the 
commitment process on two levels. First, we considered how Oklahoma 
law was written to determine whether it appeared to provide adequate 
protection of the rights of those accused of insanity. Second, we 
considered how the law is administered in Oklahoma. Concerning the 
application of the law, we hypothesized that "involuntary commitment 
proceedings in Tulsa and Payne Counties do not apply the law in a 
way that adequately protects the rights of those accused of insanity. 
Tulsa and Payne Counties were selected for the study. since it was 
economically feasible to study both areas. Adequate protection of 
rights was considered to exist if the patientts right to counsel, 
jury trial, and right to be present at his hearing were protected. If 
any one of these rights were violated, the patientts protection was 
considered inadequate. 
The first part of the study involved the development of the 
importance of each right along with an examination of how Oklahoma 
statutory and case law provided for the protection of the right. 
We found inadequate protection of the right to counsel since indigents 
are not guaranteed counsel under Oklahoma law. Oklahoma law provided 
for jury trial on demand, but this protection is meaningless without 
a lawyer to explain the right and prepare a proper defense to argue 
before the jury. It was also found that Oklahoma law allows the 
exclusion of defendants from their hearing. 
As we turned to the study of how Oklahoma law is applied in 
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Tulsa and Payne Counties, methods had to be selected to gather useful 
information about the commitment process. Non-participant observation 
was selected since it could provide information to confirm or reject 
our hypothesis. To make sure that the information was comparable 
an observation form was developed. Focused interviews were used to 
obtain information to supplement the non-participant observation. 
Information was obtained on fourteen Payne County commitment 
hearings. This information showed a total lack of protection of the 
patients t. rights. No defendants in Payne County had effective legal 
representation. During the period of study no jury trials were held 
even though one defendant demanded a jury trial. Two defendants were 
excluded from their hearing because they were hospitalized. In one 
of these cases no formal hearing was held. Thus, each of the three 
rights we considered essential to a fair hearing wete violated in Payne 
County. Beyond thi~ our information indicated that one defendant was 
not provided the legally required notice prior to his hearing, and no 
' defendant was told that he had legal rights under Oklahoma law during 
his commitment hearing. Clearly, the information obtained in Payne 
County strongly confirmed our hypothesis. 
Twenty-one Tulsa County involuntary commitment hearings were 
observed. In nineteen per cent of the cases observed the defendant 
enjoyed the representation of counsel. No jury trials were observed, 
but during 1974 slightly less than three per cent of the defendants 
had their sanity determined by a jury. Two defendants were excluded 
from their sanity hearing because they were hospitalized. One of 
these defendants did not have legal counsel during his hearing. Our 
information indicates that defendants in Tulsa County might demand 
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certain rights. They might demand a jury trial and they might even 
have legal counsel appointed if they could not hire their own lawyer. 
There are indications that while defendants might demand their rights 
they were not encouraged to do so. 
During the corrnnitment hearings no defendant was informed of his 
right to have a jury trial or counsel. Corrnnission lawyers reported 
during the hearing that the patient's right had been fully explained 
and protected at the examination, which is separate from the hearing 
in Tulsa County. In one case a commission lawyer had not informed a 
patient of his right to a jury trial because the defendant was 
cooperative. This cooperation may have been artificially stimulated 
since many Tulsa County patients received drug treatment prior to 
their hearing that tended to make them less likely to resist their 
corrnnitment. Patients who are robbed of their will to resist commit-
ment are effectively stripped of their rights even if they are told 
they may have counsel and a jury trial. Thus, our Tulsa County 
information tended to confirm our hypothesis. 
Recormnendations for Further Research 
Because the Tulsa County commitment process seemed to focus on 
the examination phase, more research is needed to find out how 
adequately the patient's rights are protected during that phase of the 
procezs. Certainly this research should tell us whether commission 
lawyers informed patients of their legal rights, and whether the 
examination was su~ficient to determine the person's sanity. 
Treating patients with drugs prior to their hearings provide 
another area for further research. Research to indicate how common 
this practice is and what impact it has on the patientst will to 
resist commitment would be helpful. 
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Further research is needed to determine whether the violations of 
state law, which occurred in Payne County, are conunon in other parts 
of the state. It similiar violations appeared in other sections of 
the state, it might be possible to develop generaliiations concerning 
what factors lead to the violation of a patient's rights. This type 
of research would move us from considering the extent of the problem 
to a greater understanding of the factors that cause violation of 
patient rights. 
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APPENDIX 
FORM C 
1. Date 2. County (1) Payne 3. City 
---------~ ----~ (2) Tulsa 
4. Judge 5. Hearing Location ( 1) judge 1 s chambers 
(2) courtroom 
(3) jail 
(4) other 
-----6. How long did the hearing last? 7. Defendant•s age 
---8. Defendant•s sex (1) Male 9. Defendant's race (1) white 
(2) Female (2) black 
(3) American 
Indian 
( 4) other 
----10. Is the sanity conunission legally complete? (A legally complete 
sanity conunission has one lawyer and two doctors.) (1) yes (2) no 
(!!_no explain on the back of this page) 
11. Was the defendant present at the hearing? (1) yes (2) no 
If no was a reason given by the conunission? Explain: 
-------
12. Was the defendant represented by counsel? (1) yes (2) no If 
yes what was the lawyer•s name? 
-----------------13. Was the defendant infonned that he had the right to obtain counsel 
at the hearing? (1) yes (2) no If yes who gave the defendant 
this information? 
14. Was the defendant informed that he had the right to have his 
sanity determined by a jury at the hearing? (1) yes (2) no 
If yes, who gave information? 
15. Was the defendant given any o~t~h-e_r_a~dv-.-ic_e_r_e_g_a_r_d~i~n-g--....h~i-s--..l_e_g_a~l~--
rights at the hearing? (1) yes (2) no If yes explain what advice 
was given and who gave it 
------------------~ 
16. Did the defendant appear confused by the conunitment hearing? 
(1) yes (2) no If yes what made the defendant appear confused? 
17. Did the defendant say that he felt he would be committed regard-
less of what he said or did during the hearing? (1) yes (2) no 
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FOR EACH CCMMISSION MEMBER READ THE LIST OF STATEMENTS BELOW AND CIRCLE 
THE NUMBERS AFTER THEIR NAME THAT BEST DESCRIBE THEIR BEHAVIOR AT THE 
HEARING AND REACTION TO THE DEFENDANT. MORE THAN ONE NUMBER MAY BE 
CIRCLED. 
18. Judge 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
19. Lawyer Lawyerrs address 
( 1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
20. Doctor Doctorts address 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
21. Doctor Doctorrs address 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ....,..(1-0..,.-) --=-0-1..,.-) --=-(1-2..-) --
IF ANYTHING ABOUT ANY OF THE COMMISSION MEMBERS BEHAVIOR. WAS PARTicu.::. 
LARLY SIGNIFICANT PLEASE CCMMENT OF THE BACK OF THIS PAGE. 
(1) The commission member did not play an active role in the 
hearing. 
(2) The commission member acted as if the defendant was not 
(3) 
( 4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
present at the hearing. He talked about the defendant, but 
did not talk to the defendant. 
The corrnnission member treated the defendant as if he were a 
child who could not understand the nature of the hearing. 
The corrnnission member acted as if the defendant were an adult 
who could understand the nature of the hearing. 
The corrnnission member treated the defendant like he was a 
violent person that could not be trusted. 
The corrnnission member treated the defendant like he was a 
bad person who needed punishment. 
The commission member treated the defendant like he was a 
normal person until proven insane. 
The corrnnission member treated the defendant like he was sick 
and needed help. 
The commission member treated the defendant like he was a 
problem who was a burden to others. 
The corrnnission memberrs treatment of the defendant could best 
be characterized as helpful since he did his best to explain 
things to the defendant even when the defendant did not ask 
for the information. 
The corrnnission memberts treatment of the defendant could best 
be characterized as neutral since he answered questions, but 
did not encourage them. 
The corrnnission memberrs treatment of the defendant could best 
be characterized as negative since he discouraged the de-
fend.ant ts participation in the hearing. 
22. Which of the following best describes how much the defendant 
participated verbally in the hearing? 
(1) Withdrawn (The defendant did not say anything and would not 
answer questions.) 
(2) Passive (The defendant's response was limited. He gave 
partial answers to questions but did not say as 
much as he could have under the circumstances.) 
68 
(3) Cooperative (The defendant gave full answers to questions 
but did not make any connnerits unless there was 
an appropriate opportunity.) 
(4) Assertive (The defendant said more than he was asked to. He 
inte:t:rupted a few times to say what he wanted. He 
may have used questions to lead into the dis-
cussion of new areas he wanted to bring up.) 
(5) Uncooperative (The defendant tried to entirely control the 
hearing, and constantly interrupted. He tried 
to dominate the proceeding.) 
Explain. 
23. How would you rate the defendantts general behavior at the 
hearing? 
(1) He ignored the hearing. (He did not seem to realize 
hearing was in progress or 
no reaction to it.) 
that the 
showed 
(2) He was submissive. (He did what he was expected to. He did 
not do anything on his own initiative 
but waited for others to indicate what 
he should do.) 
(3) He was defiant. (He defended himself, rejecting any suggestion 
that he should be connnitted in a well 
mannered but firm manner.) 
(4) He was hostile. (He attacked the suggestion that he should be 
committed in an aggressive non-violent 
manner.) 
(5) He was violent. (He attacked the suggestion that he should be 
committed in a violent manner.) I 
24. If the defendant was represented by counsel what arguments did the 
the lawyer present against connnitment? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Lawyerts name 
Address 
List arguments: 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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25. Did any others play a significant role in the hearing besides the 
commission members, judge, defendant, and defendantis lawyer? 
(1) yes (2) no If yes tell who the person or persons were and 
what role they played: 
~-----------------------~ 
26. Hearing decision (1) conunitment (2) not to commit (3) other 
-----
27. Did the commitment order contain or was it understood that any 
special conditions were part of the connnitment order? (1) yes 
(2) no If yes explain: 
28. If the person was committed what reason for commitment was pre-
sented by the hearing? 
---~--------------------------~ 
29. List any background information you have about his case. 
(Give Source.) 
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